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The Levitt (2004) model of sportsbook behavior is tested using actual percentages of dollars bet on
NFL games from the internet sportsbook, Sportsbook.com. Simple regression results suggest that
Sportsbook.com sets pointspreads (prices) to maximize profits, as the Levitt model assumes, not to
balance the betting dollars, as the traditional model of sportsbook behavior assumes. Sportsbook.com
is found to accept significantly more wagering dollars on road favorites, larger favorites, and on the
over for the highest totals in the over/under betting market. Bettor liquidity constraints and sportsbook
betting limits may help explain this result.
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In his paper “Why are Gambling Markets Organized So Differently From
Financial Markets,” Steven Levitt (2004) stated that sportsbooks tend to set
betting pointspreads in the NFL at a price that is different than the market
clearing price. Levitt stated that instead of attempting to balance the betting
dollars on each side of the proposition, as commonly assumed in other models
of sportsbook behavior such as Zuber et al. (1985) and Sauer et al. (1988),
sportsbooks set pointspreads (prices) to maximize profits. According to Levitt,
sportsbooks are more skilled than bettors at predicting the outcomes of games
and use their insight into common bettor biases, such as betting big favorites
and road favorites, to set pointspreads at a level slightly higher than implied by
efficiency. Therefore, sportsbooks are able to earn higher profits by accepting
more betting dollars on the popular side of these propositions, rather than just
collecting their commission by balancing bets.
Although past studies of various sports gambling markets have shown that
the overall markets appear to be efficient, there have been studies across sports
that have shown that various subsets of gambling markets, such as betting big
underdogs and betting home underdogs in sides (betting on the winner in a
contest) markets win more than implied by efficiency. Examples of these studies
include Golec and Tomarkin (1991) and Gray and Gray (1997). In totals markets,
simple strategies of betting the under have also been shown to be profitable
(Paul and Weinbach, 2002).
The results of these efficiency studies imply the behavior of the sportsbook
could be different than attempting to balance betting dollars on each side of the
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proposition. The difficulty in attempting to discern the actions of the sportsbook
is that actual betting dollars, or percentage of bets placed on each side of the
proposition, have been very difficult for researchers to obtain. Sportsbooks have
generally guarded this information, likely with very good reason, and
researchers in this field have been left to speculate as to the actual operation of
the sportsbook from their results that have either supported the efficient markets
hypothesis or found slight deviations from the predicted prices.
Levitt (2004) used data from a sports betting tournament to illustrate that
sportsbooks do not balance the betting dollars on each side of the proposition
in the NFL sides betting market. This result holds important implications for
the study of the efficient markets hypothesis in relation to sports and other
prediction markets, but it does suffer from a few problems. One major concern
about the Levitt (2004) study is the use of a betting tournament instead of
actual sportsbook activity. The tournament in the study uses a limited number
of participants and does not include all of the betting dollars that are attracted
by a real sportsbook. In addition, betting in a tournament does not truly reflect
marginal behavior of bettors. In the tournament studied, bettors paid a fixed
cost entry fee of $250 and made picks on the games each week. Therefore, the
bettors did not face a marginal outlay of money for each of their bets, which is
very different than the setting of bettors in normal wagering markets and could
lead to very different results. Additionally, the fixed entry fee of $250 for a
season is likely a trivial amount for most bettors, as many bettors bet more
than that amount each week of the NFL season and some bet more than that
amount per game. Therefore, the sample of the bettors in the tournament may
not reflect the true population of bettors who wager on NFL games.
Although the results of the Levitt study are appealing and support the results
found in various efficient markets studies across sports, the nature of the
tournament data is a major concern. Data from an actual sportsbook, containing
percentage of all dollars bet on each side of the proposition, would be very helpful
in alleviating any concerns about the results due to the problems of using the
betting tournament data. Thankfully, this data has become available from a major
on-line sportsbook. Each day, Sportsbook.com, a major internet sportsbook,
shows the percentage of betting dollars bet on each side of each betting
proposition for all major sports. Although the number of dollars bet on each game
is not published, and likely varies by game, the percentage of bets taken on each
side is presented each day.
Given the public availability of the data, we gathered the Sportsbook.com
percentage bet data each day after NFL games were played. Gathering the data
immediately after each week of games was played insured that we obtained
the percentage of dollars bet at the closing pointspread (sides market) and total
(totals market). With a full season of actual sportsbook data, we could then
test the same hypotheses that Levitt tested with full sample of data on bettors,
rather than data from a betting tournament.
Section II shows the regression results of a simple model of percentage of
dollars bet on the favorite and on the over. These results support the findings
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of Levitt for sides markets and the simple tests are extended into totals
markets and explore similar sportsbook profit-maximizing behavior in that
market. Section II also shows the returns to the sportsbook decision not to
balance the betting dollars, which also gives the returns to a bettor who bet
against the public and therefore took the same position as the sportsbook in the
wager. Section III explores some possible explanations, beyond those
proposed by Levitt (2004), for why the sportsbook may have the ability to set a
profit-maximizing price and why betting markets are not truly open markets.
II. SPORTSBOOK.COM DATA AND THE DECISION TO NOT
BALANCE BETTING DOLLARS
Sportsbook.com, a major internet sportsbook, can be found at
www.sportsbook.com. Before regulation was changed in the U.S. in 2006 (to
begin in 2007) making the transferring of money by credit card companies and
financial institutions to internet sportsbooks illegal, sportsbook.com had betting
clients from the United States and all over the world who could transfer money
into accounts through bank transfers, credit cards, Western Union, or internet
transfer systems such as Netteller.com. Sportsbook.com reports to be the leading
online sportsbook in the US by a variety of measures, and highlights a peak level
of activity of fifteen bets per second. The percentage of dollars bet on each side of
the available proposition can be found on the page labeled “Betting Trends”.
As mentioned in the introduction, the percentages for each NFL game
were gathered at the conclusion of the games. Data were gathered for both the
sides (betting on a team against the pointspread) and totals (betting on the total
amount of points scored by both teams) markets. Included on the “Betting
Trends” link on www.sportsbook.com was the percentage bet on each team,
percentage bet on the over and the under, and the current pointspread and
total, which becomes the closing pointspread and total after the games are
played. This data, which is only available, after the market is opened, for the
time leading up to the game and for one day following the game, was gathered
for each game of the 2006–07 NFL regular season and is the dataset used for
the regression results presented in this section.
A very simple regression model is tested, which illustrates the actions of
the sportsbook very clearly. The model to be estimated is as follows for the
sides (pointspread) market:
ð%Bet on the FavoriteÞi ¼ a0 þ b1ðPointspreadÞi
þ b2ðDummy forRoadFavoriteÞi þ 1ið1Þ
The dependent variable is the percentage of dollars bet on the favorite.
The independent variables include an intercept, the pointspread on the game
(presented as a positive number – greater favorites have larger pointspreads),
and a dummy for teams which are road favorites. This simple regression model
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allows testing of the ideas put forth in the study of the betting tournament by
Levitt (2004). First, if sportsbooks presume that bettors will overbet favorites
and stronger favorites will be bet more heavily than weaker favorites, the
coefficient b1 should be positive and significant. If the sportsbook also realizes
that bettors tend to overbet road favorites, the coefficient on the dummy
variable, b2, should also be positive and significant. The regression results are
also shown for the subsets of home favorites and road favorites. Given the
separation of the data into home and road favorites, the road favorite dummy
variable is not needed in the last two regression specifications.
As easily can be seen from the first regression results (the column labeled All
Favorites), the results from the actual sportsbook, Sportsbook.com, are similar to
the results found in the data from the betting tournament in Levitt (2004).
The pointspread is shown to have a positive and significant effect on the
percentage of dollars bet on the favorite. In short, as the pointspread increases, a
larger percentage of bets are made on the favorite. For example, the model results
predict a home favorite of 3 points would have greater than 56% of the dollars
wagered on that team. A home favorite of 7 points would have more than 61% of
the dollars wagered on that team. Although slightly smaller, percentage-wise,
than the findings of the betting tournament in Levitt (2004), Sportsbook.com
definitely does not attempt to balance the betting dollars exactly. In fact, the
bigger the favorite, the more unbalanced the betting dollars become. Given big
underdogs have been shown to win more often than implied by efficiency in the
NFL, and other sports, it appears that sportsbooks do shade the pointspread
higher, but not as high as would equalize betting action. In keeping the
pointspread below the market clearing price, the sportsbook is willing to accept
unbalanced wagering dollars, and therefore incur risk to attempt to maximize
profits, due to the consistent bias of bettors to overbet favorites.
TABLE 1
Regression Results for Percentage Bet on Favorites at Sportsbook.com for the
2006–07 NFL Season
Dep. Var.: %
of Dollars Bet
on Favorite
All Favorites
(256 games)
Home Favorites
(175 games)
Road Favorites
(81 games)
Intercept 0.5225*** (35.2366) 0.5138*** (30.2277) 0.7185*** (36.5783)
Pointspread 0.0131*** (6.5683) 0.0145*** (6.1891) 0.0054 (1.3465)
Road Favorite
Dummy
0.1626*** (10.7627)
Regression results are presented for the Sportsbook.com betting data for the 2006–07 NFL Season.
The dependent variable is % of the dollars bet on the favorite. The independent variables include an
intercept, the pointspread (positive value for favorite), and a dummy variable if the favorite was the road
team. For each independent variable, the coefficient and accompanying t-statistic is shown. The results are
shown for the sample as a whole, the sample of home favorites, and for the sample of road favorites.
*-notation denotes significance of a t-test that the coefficient is different from zero. * is significant at 10%,
** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%.
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The dummy variable for road favorites is also positive and significant.
Being a road favorite adds an additional 16% bet on the favorite. For example,
a 3-point road favorite will generate greater than 72% of the wagering dollars
on the favorite, while a 7-point road favorite will generate greater than 77% of
the wagering dollars on the favorite. Sportsbook.com allows bettors to wager
more money on road favorites, without changing the line to the market-
clearing price, as they recognize the bias of bettors to overbet the road team.
This likely has nothing to do with the public preferring teams that are on the
road, but has more to do with the public overbetting good teams. Good teams
are stronger favorites at home and will be road favorites against poorer teams.
Therefore, the public willingness to overbet good teams explains both the
imbalance of betting dollars on big favorites and road favorites.
A natural extension of the pointspread betting market explained in the
Levitt model of sportsbook behavior is to the totals market in the NFL.
Although the NFL totals market has been shown to be efficient in the overall
sample, the over has been shown to be overbet at the highest totals in the NFL,
with under bets winning more than implied by efficiency in this subset (Paul and
Weinbach, 2002). The simple behavioral bias evident in the totals market is that
bettors prefer to bet the over to the under. The over may simply be regarded by
bettors as a more pleasurable proposition to root for when watching the game.
The over allows one to enjoy the excitement of scoring plays, while betting the
under in a game may be more difficult to enjoy as a bettor watches. Under
bettors must hope for a lack of scoring, which generally involves many punts,
turnovers, and generally unexciting play. If sportsbooks realize that bettors are
likely to have a bias toward betting the over, particularly in games between two
high-scoring teams which results in the highest totals, they are likely to allow
unbalanced betting action on the over compared to the under in these games.
The totals market is tested in the same manner as the sides market above.
In this case, there is no need to distinguish between home and road teams as
bets on totals are based on the combined score of both teams. Therefore, the
simple regression model is:
ð% Bet on the OverÞi ¼ a0 þ b1ðTotalÞi þ 1i:ð2Þ
If more wagers are accepted on the over as total increases, then b1 should be
positive and significant. The results are presented in table II.
As can be seen from the regression results, the total has a positive and
significant effect on the percentage of dollars bet on the over. Simply, the higher
the total, the greater amount of money bet on the over. The range of totals in the
2006–07 season was between 31 and 55 with an average total of 40.5 and
a median of 40.5. Given that range, a total of 31 is predicted, from the model, to
attract 55% of the wagers on the over, while a total of 55 is predicted to attract
76% of the wagers on the over. A total of 40.5, the sample mean, is predicted to
attract 63% of the wagers on the over. In summary, sportsbook.com is willing to
accept a much higher percentage of the wagers they receive on the over rather
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than the under. This is likely due to knowledge of the behavioral biases of
bettors toward the over. Not only are NFL totals set too high, for the games with
the highest totals, but bettors still overbet the over in great numbers.
Given that sportsbook.com chooses not to balance the betting dollars on
each game and total, how successful was this profit-maximizing strategy for
Sportsbook.com in the 2006–07 season? In addition, since the percentage bet
on each proposition is public information on the sportsbook.com website, how
did bettors fare who took a contrarian view and bet against the public in games
where the percentage bet on the favorite or the over exceeded a certain
threshold? These two questions are easily answered, simultaneously, by simply
observing the win-loss records for betting the underdog (sides market) or the
under (totals market) when the percentage of dollars bet on the favorite or the
over exceed a certain number. For purposes of simplicity, we choose thresholds
of 55%, 60%, 65%, and 70% for comparison purposes. Although these
percentages are somewhat arbitrary, they would be very simple rules for bettors
to follow and illustrate the success that sportsbook.com has in using their profit-
maximizing strategy. Table III presents the results for the sides market and
table IV presents the results for the totals market. In table III, the percentage
used for the betting rule to bet against the more popular side of the proposition is
presented in the first column, the number of favorite wins in the second column,
number of underdog wins in the third column, the underdog win percentage
TABLE 2
Regression Results for Percentage Bet on Overs at Sportsbook.com for the 2006–07
NFL Season
Dep. Var.: % of Dollars Bet on Over Entire Sample (256 games)
Intercept 0.2669*** (3.5720)
Total 0.0090*** (4.8916)
Regression results are presented for the Sportsbook.com betting data for the 2006–07 NFL Season.
The dependent variable is % of the dollars bet on the over for wagers on the total. The independent variables
include an intercept and the total. For each independent variable, the coefficient and accompanying
t-statistic is shown.
*-notation denotes significance of a t-test that the coefficient is different from zero. * is significant at 10%,
** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%.
TABLE 3
Simple Pointspread Betting Simulation: Bet the Opposite of the Public (Bet the
Underdog) When the Percentage of Dollars Bet on the Favorite exceeds a Given
Percentage
Percentage Bet
on the Favorite
Favorite
Wins
Underdog
Wins
Underdog Win
Percentage
Earnings for contrarian
bettors who bet $110 on the
Underdog in Each Game
70% þ 37 66 64.08% $2530
65% þ 53 83 61.03% $2470
60% þ 73 94 56.29% $1370
55% þ 83 112 57.44% $2070
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(following the betting strategy) is presented in the fourth column, and the
returns to a hypothetical bettor who wagered $110 (to win $100 given the
sportsbook commission) on each game that met the betting rule. Table IV
presents the same for totals, where overs replace favorites, and unders replace
underdogs in the betting strategies.
It appears that the strategy of accepting more wagers on the favorite was very
beneficial to sportsbook.com in 2006–07. In situations where bettors wagered
70% or more of the money on the favorite, the underdog won over 64% of the
time. Win percentages for the underdog exceed 56% in all categories listed. For
bettors who used the publicly available information to essentially bet the same
side as the sportsbook (given the wagering is imbalanced, sportsbook.com is an
active participant in these wagers and is “betting” on the underdog to win), large
profits were garnered.
The strategy of sportsbook.com to accept more wagers on the over rather
than the under in the totals market was successful, but not as profitable as the
sides market. In situations where 70% or more of the bets were on the over,
unders won more than 54% of the time. Even with a threshold of 55%, unders
won more than half of the time. Bettors who attempted to use this public
information to place their own bets found profitability only when betting against
the public in games where the betting dollars were most lopsided toward the over.
III. PROFIT MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOR OF THE
SPORTSBOOK AND WHY IT PERSISTS
Levitt (2004) states a variety of reasons that sportsbooks could profit by
setting a price other than the market-clearing price in the betting market for
the NFL (and other sports). Levitt suggests that the sportsbook is expected to
be more skilled at predicting game outcomes and has insight into behavioral
biases of bettors. These results do beg the question (as Levitt asks in his
paper), however, why skilled bettors do not recognize the biases of the betting
public and bet simple strategies against them? In theory, this would take away
the profit opportunities of the sportsbook and would remove the biases seen in
closing lines. In short, it would make the market efficient. We wish to
comment on two factors that were not addressed by Levitt to speculate as to
TABLE 4
Simple Total Betting Simulation: Bet the Opposite of the Public (Bet the Under)
When the Percentage of Dollars Bet on the Over exceeds a Given Percentage
Percentage Bet
on the Over
Over
Wins
Under
Wins
Under Win
Percentage
Earnings from $110 Bet
on the Under in Each Game
70% þ 40 47 54.02% $300
65% þ 57 65 53.28% $230
60% þ 78 75 49.02% 2$1080
55% þ 90 93 50.82% 2$600
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why this market has exhibited biased closing pointspreads and totals and why
patterns of unbalanced betting action may persist.
First, individual bettors and betting syndicates may face liquidity issues
which could allow the sportsbook to price to maximize profits rather than
clearing the market. Collectively, contrarian bettors may not be able to wager
enough money to counter the betting biases of the public. Therefore,
sportsbooks may not be concerned with this level of betting by informed bettors
and could leave the pointspreads and totals where they currently set them.
If bettors do have the knowledge and liquidity to bet against the betting
public, they might not be willing to handle the huge variance in betting
markets. Outcomes of sporting events are quite noisy and strategies that are
profitable in the long-run can incur large losses week-to-week, month-to-
month, and season-to-season. For instance, if a bettor were to follow the betting
strategy (bet home underdogs) put forth in the Levitt article for the following
NFL season of 2005–06, bettors would have incurred large losses. For
individual bettors, and even for larger betting syndicates, a year like 2005–06
could cause the loss of their entire bankroll. Given the great variance in
outcomes in sporting events, groups with the liquidity to ride out the variance
may find greater expected returns in other financial markets as opposed to
sports betting. Therefore, there may be limited bettors/groups that are willing
to bet large sums of money on NFL games as an investment strategy. This
allows the sportsbook to continue their practice of pricing to maximize profits.
A second possible explanation for the persistence of this pricing by the
sportsbook is that the market itself is not truly free and open. The sportsbook
has power within this market and it gives them the opportunity to offer prices
that are in their favor. One source of power is that the sportsbook has the right to
refuse any bet. They do not have to accept a bet on any particular proposition,
nor from any particular person or group. An extension of this is the existence of
limits on wagers. Limits place a restriction on the size of a bet by any particular
person. These limits are generally aimed at suspected informed bettors as the
sportsbook often acts under the practice of “booking to face”. “Booking to
face” refers to the practice of monitoring betting activity and adjusting betting
rules for particular customers. Given that the sportsbook may recognize
informed bettors, or “runners” for informed bettors or betting syndicates, the
sportsbook can use this information to their advantage. The sportsbook may
relax or enforce limits on the size of the bets of informed traders, allowing the
sportsbook to set a profit-maximizing price rather than a market-clearing one.
This structural advantage by the sportsbook allows them to post biased lines
and accept unequal betting action in certain situations they deem favorable.
If the market were truly open and sportsbooks were mandated to accept all
wagers of any size, the biases of closing pointspreads would likely be reduced,
because informed traders would have greater opportunity to bet on the opposite
side of the general public when public biases are built into the lines.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The findings of the Levitt (2004) model of sportsbook behavior, where
sportsbooks set a profit-maximizing price (pointspread) rather than a market-
clearing price, are tested using actual percentages of betting dollars from a real
sportsbook, Sportsbook.com. The findings of Levitt (2004) came from a betting
tournament where the data reflected the betting actions of a small group of
tournament participants, not the full betting activity accepted by a sportsbook.
In addition, the tournament data involved a one-time small fixed cost of entry
($250), instead of the usual marginal activity of betting where bettors have an
actual monetary outlay for each game on which they wager. These problems
being noted, however, the Levitt model of sportsbook behavior does go a long
way in explaining the results of pointspreads being slightly biased in the NFL
and other sports.
The purpose of this study was to use actual data from a large world-wide
sportsbook to test the hypothesis put forth in Levitt (2004). Sportsbook.com, a
large internet casino available to bettors around the world, makes the
percentage of dollars bet on each side of the proposition available to the public
on their internet site each day leading up to a game and on the day after the
game. We gathered this data for the NFL for each game played in the 2006–07
regular season and tested the hypotheses stated in Levitt (2004). Specifically,
we tested whether bettors exhibited natural biases toward overbetting road
favorites and big favorites and that sportsbooks are willing to accept
unbalanced betting dollars on these games rather than attempting to perfectly
balance the bets, as traditionally assumed in sportsbook models.
The findings of the simple regression results for Sportsbook.com were
striking. A much larger percentage of dollars are bet, and accepted, on road
favorites. In addition, the higher the pointspread on the game, the higher the
percentage of dollars that is bet, and accepted, on the favorite. Specifically, being
a road favorite increases the percentage of bets on that team by more than 16%.
Also, with each additional point that a favorite is favored by, the percentage of
dollars bet on that team rises by 1.31%. Seven-point favorites, for example, have
a higher percentage of bets on them than a three-point favorite. Put simply, fans
overbet the best teams in the league which leads to sportsbooks accepting a much
higher percentage of the wagering dollars on big favorites and road favorites.
This leads to a closing pointspread in this market which maximizes profits as the
sportsbook does not strictly attempt to set a market clearing price.
Given that dollars wagered on totals (over-under) bets were also available,
we also tested to see if Sportsbook.com was willing to accept unbalanced
wagering dollars on totals wagers. Specifically, we tested to see if bettors overbet
the over and if the sportsbook is willing to accept more dollars on the over. Bettor
bias toward the over is quite easy to recognize as a simple strategy of betting the
under in the NFL was shown to win more often than implied by efficiency (Paul
and Weinbach, 2002). In the totals market, as well as the pointspread market,
Sportsbook.com does not appear to be balancing bets on each side of the
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proposition. Far more bets are wagered, and accepted, on the over rather than the
under. For the mean total in the sample, 40.5 points, the amount wagered on the
over accounts for 63% of the bets. Again, it appears that Sportsbook.com sets a
price in this market (the total) to maximize profits, not to clear the market.
The question of why an informed bettor or group of bettors would not also
recognize these biases of the betting public and use the same betting strategy
that the sportsbook uses to maximize profits is certainly an interesting and
important one to address. A few possible explanations, in addition to what was
stated in Levitt (2004), are noted. One possible explanation for the persistence
of this behavior by the sportsbook is suggested to be the high variance in game
outcomes which can create liquidity problems for potential contrarian bettors
or syndicates. Another important reason for the persistence of this sportsbook
behavior is that the sports betting market is not truly a free market because
sportsbooks may place limits on wagers (generally targeted at informed
bettors) and the sportsbook has the right to refuse any wager they desire.
These institutional advantages give the sportsbook the power to set price to
profit-maximize as opposed to pricing to clear the market.
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